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1. INTRODUC.TION
tioncooperative game theory has achieved a tremendous success in the refinement for ex-
tensive forrn qames since Kreps and Wilson ( 1982) introduced the notion of aequential
equilibrium. '1'he notion can eGminate many unreasonable Nash equiGbria by requiring se-
yuential rationality from players. 1'he power of sequential rationality, however, comee from
two diSereut parts of thP requirement. One is the requirement that a player must hold
a b~lir( system about past moves. The other is the equiGbrium hypothesis that a player
at any iufurmation set rnusl rxpert an cquilibrium play iu the futurc. Quite often thc
second part is crucially responsible for the power o[ the sequential rationality requirement.
A simple osample is thc game of F'iqure L In the Nash but nonsequential equiGbrium
~:1, l,: d), t h~, t hrfat of d to pl:~w~r I b,y player I f is .judQwl ompty Ir~'ra.nse pla,v~r I I at. node
r mnst expect player I to take L at node y, whinc ~ompels player li tu take a. Bul wheu thP
`ash eyuilibrium (.d, I„d) is supposed to be rorntnon kuowledge, why must pla.ver II expect.
Ihe ecluilibrium play L a(ter the supposition itself is refuted by the fact of deviation D?
lho theory oCsequential equilibrium caa not answer this question since it is a hypothesis
exogenoush. imposcvl on the theory.
OnP way to answer this question is by offering a model which describea how a devia-
tion cuuld orrur. F'udenberR, hmps and LecinP ( 1988) provide such a modei, in whích a
deviation occurs because the deviator's payoff turns out to be different from what it was
thought to he with high probability. According to them, the Nash equilibrium (A,L;d)
i, snpporled when the game o( Figure 1 is viewed as a part of an extended game of the
[oUowing kind. There are two typas (.q and B) of player I. Nature moves firat to randomly
rhoose onr~ ~f the t,vpes and privately inform player I of the realization. Then player I and
playc~r II plac the game of F'igure 1. If player I is type A, the payoff assignments to him is
exact.ly as in F'igure ]. lf player ( is type B, he receives 0 from A, 1 from D -~ a, 2 from
I) -- d-- I„ and a fruw D ~ d-. Ii'. F'or any small enough positivo probahility that type
B is rhosen, a strategy profile in which player I takes ( A, L) if he is type A and (D, R) if he
iti lype Il whili~ pay~~r 11 t:rkos cl ia a perfect eyuilibrium- of the extondiYJ game. '1'he payoff
unfrrt.;tintv, hnwever, implies that the atrurtum uf the ronflicta among the playcrs' intoreats
''fh~~y n,~~ :r slightl}' different rriterion Callf`ll near titrlftllP,afi fnr sr~lecting equilibrix in
16r cxtfudcd Famc.mudcled by tho payoff asnignments is fhangnl (rom the original qamc of F'igure 1 to the
oxtoudcd qanlc. If, a.v Rubinstein ( 1991) argucd, noncooperative qame theory attumpts to
devPlop our undcrstanding of a rational play in a given conflict, we óope that the model o[
fOlllllft ItSPIf IK cOrreft. PIaIOPIv we hope to exclude payoff uncertainty.
ls the cquilibrium hypothesis justified once we exclude payoff uncertainty? Some au-
thors, e.g. Rinmore ( 1987) and Kreps ( 1989), have argued informally that it might not be
justific~d dnc to the possibility that a player holds a different equilibrium understanding,or a
"mistaken theory", from other playets although all of the understandings are eligible. Some
other authors, e.g. McLennan ( 1985) and Hillas ( 1987), have even attempted to formali2e
the notion of an alternative equilibrium play. Rut none of them has succeeded in provid-
inq a Iheorctifal model in which equilibrium misunderstanding induces a deviation, to the
extcnt that F'udc~nberq, F:reps and Levine ( 1988) did for the payoff uncertainty argmnent.
Thc purposc of this paper is to develop a"mistaken theories" refinement3 equipped with
:~n ~~xplifit mnd~~l uf ~~qnilibrilnn Iui..nndontandinR and, in IiKht of tho rcfincmont., cxarniur
thc ,~xtenl Ihal the eyuilibrium hypothesis uf scquential cyuilirbiwn is justified. Section
'l d,~w~lop, II„~ fnnuulatiou of th,~ mfinoment fallc~d the fottsistcnry criterion. Section 3
proscnts thc main results. Sectíon 4 gices some remarks on the approach adopted in this
papcr.
Z. CONSISTENT SET OF STRATEGY PROFILES
Uur~ miGht wuudcr if it is cvct possible for rational players to plxy acfordiug to differettt
Pqnilibrium undcrstandings. The game' of Figure 2 illustrates that it is actuall,y possible
by the followiug inforrual story. ('onsider a tiash eyuilibrium o~r -(D;a,W;!). It is not
sPqueutial because player [I at node r should take d given the equiGbrium hypothesis that
playcr I11 will take l. Howovcr imaginc MHAs Icarning game thmr,v at onP of two business
sfhools fallcd H-school and S-schooL 'Che profPSSOrs at both schools teach that there are
two rPasonahle ways to play the game; one is oH and the other is another Nash equilibrium
o' -(A;a, E:r). Rnt customarily li-school MllAs play o~r aud S-school MBAs play a5.
In a nrruitinq soason. oach MHA i, hircd by nnc of two firms rallcd H-firm and S-firm.
' fhe narno is hy F:reps ( 191i9).
a`l'his cxarnplc was developrd in fonvcrsation with D. Kreps.4
1[-firm hireti H-echool ?v[I1as mainly and ti-firm hims S-school MBAs mainly. However thcre
is a small chanci, that by some mistake in the recruiting process an MBA inadvertently goes
to the wroug firm. Suppose that there are the same larqe number of H-school MBAs a.nd
S-school IV1BAs, and that the chance of an H-school MBA's going to S-firm and the chance
of an S-school MBA's going to H-firm are equal and independent. After the recruitinq
season, a group of threP MBAs is formed b,y random matching in a firm and play the game
of I'ignre Y. :lsaume that it is prival,e inforwatiun whether a particular playcr is an H-
srhool MBA or an ti-school MRA. and that it. is never known to MBAs whether they are
iu II-firm nr 5-lirm. If all the abuve is common knowlaige, it is rational for every MBA to
follow his own sehool custom. F.xamine the nonsequential action a after A prescribed by
oH for an H-school MBA acting as player IL In the play environment described above, he
would not interpret the deviation :~ from the H-school custom as a trembling hand mistake
by payor I who is an t{-school bIBA, but rather would believe that player 1 must. be an
5-school Mli:~, since a' does prescribe A for player I. Given this information, he attempts
to reahon whether player III will be an H-schcxil MBA or an S-school MBA. There are two
possibilities. One is that he is in H-firm but an S-school MBA has been mistakenly placed
there and arted as player I. In this case, player Itl will also be an H-school MBA with high
probability. 'fhe other possibility is that player 1[ himself has bcrn mistakenly placed at
S. firm and hF is playing against playcr I who is an S-school MBA and has visited lhe right
firm. In this case, playPr l!! will likely be an S-schoo) ~IBA. Uue to the symmetry of thP
play envirnnmeut, playPr II assesses the probability z that playpr II1 will be an H-school
~111.1 wtw will play ! aud the probability Z that pla,yer llI will be an S-school MBA who
will play r. 1'layer I1 prefers n to the lottery of zI f ~ r implied by d, as oH prescribes for
him. Thua it is ratioual for an H-school player I[ seeing A to act according to his custom
o~~. The reader may easily verify that this is always the case for all MBAs from both
schools. 'I'hus it is possiblP for rational players to play according to different eyuilibrium
nnderstandinq,, including cven a nonsequential equilihrium.
'1'he above story is predicated on a specific matching device of MBAs with different
eyuilibrium undPrstandings. The Pssence of the story, however, is that the fiual distribution
over 16P set of pla,yers' idPUtity configurations simultaneously qenerates player's beGefs
about the opponents' past moves and about thP opponents' future moves. We shall formalize5
this essenre to define the following "ntistaken theories" refinement. We shall apply the
ernbedding technique of Fudenberg. l;reps and l.evine (198R) to the incomplete information
with respect to payers' equilibrium understandings. We consider any finite extensive form
game G with perfect recall. Let I be the set of pla,yers. Dne to the Kuhn's (1953) theorem,
the strategic opportunity for each player i E I is represented by the set E; of behaviorally
mixed strategies. Consider any finite set C C~~EI E; ot strategy profiles. Then consider
any fu)ly rnized probability distribution q E lnt.7(Cr) over the set of possible configurations
of payers' identities. :1 configuration (o~)jEI E CI assigns to eacó player j a strategy
profile o~ from the sPt ('.5 We define an extenaíve Jorm game G(C, q) asaociated with the
oriKinal Kame (; via the pa.ir ((',q). 'The trc~~ of C(C,q) consists of ~Cr~ replicas of the
tnr of (:. ;~ replira is denoted as T((aj)jEI) corresponding to the element (oj)jEI E(,'r,
1-et 7: Ut„~ I,ErE~'r ~(I?~ )jEIJ --' T be the mapping which maps node x in a replica tree
~t ((o~)jEI) to the corresponding node y(.r) in the t,ree 1' of the original game G. The
placer sel nf (:((',q) is I x C. Ylayer (i,a) E I x C owns node .r E T((o~)jEI) if and only
if nodo ~(.r1 Iti OK'lIP1I bY pldYPr i in the original gamP G and tbe replica trcc !'((a~)jEI)
is such that o' - a. If a player owns no node in a replica tree T((oj)jEI), then he is a
dummy playPr in the tree T((o~)jEI). If the player (à,o) E I x C is active in a replica
trm '1'((oi ),EI), his payoff at tPrminal node z E T((oj)jEI) is identical with the payoS to
player à at lerminal uudc~ y(.) iu the oriqiual game G. A dummy player gets zero payoff.
An active player (i,o) E I x C in a replica tree T((oj)jEI) has a set of poasible actions
at his node r E T((oJ}jEr) which is identical with the set of possible actions at node
y(r) in the original game G. At the node r, however, the information set h(x) containing
node r in Ihe game (:(C,q) is replicated with respect to hie opponent's identity profile
lrt'}~~~ F ~'t~' Ill the.,c~t. lr(r) - lJt,,,t,r,fc r~,{y Ilfl(~(j)1)r1 "f'(~,(o')j~;)}. F'inally an
initial nudc, rr E f((o')jEt) IS ChOSPn by Nature with probability q((oj)jEt)p(7(w)) where
V(71 ~i')) is the probability that initial node ry(r~) is chosen in the original game G6 This
means that. thP replira trcw T((a~ )jEr) is played with probability q((nj)~Er). This completes
5 Wr ntir sutirrscript j lo dPnntr. that n~ is tho equilihriurn understanding hcld by playcr
j. I;:rrll n~ in ~d 16r~ G~rm nr (n; ),r t whr~ro o~ drnul.~~:: Ihr yl.ralry;y fur playrr i pmar'rihi~d
by lhe ~trategy profilc~ o~ that pla}'er j believes.
E tiUtP Ihat thl' a561gI1tIlPnt Of Illltlál prObab111tICR IR R'B)I dP.fiRCd dne to the assumption
that y E Int.)(('r) is fully mixed.6
the definition of C(C,y). With the definition of actions and information sets for the game
C((',q), thc space of behavior strategies e;,, for pla,Ver ( i,o) E I x C in the game G(C,q)
is ~.', itselL ( 'all a strategy profile s- (s;,,,)t;,,,tEtxc. E"'.EI~E~. ~; an implcmentation
of l' if .ti;,,, - o, for any ( i,o) E I x C. Now we define the criterion that the set (' is a
collection o( simultaneously reasonable ways to play the original game C.
Deflnition
:1 nonempty finitP set C of behavior strategy profiles in G is said to be consistent if
and onh i( there exists a sequence {qm}m-t in Int;~(CI) such that
I) the,equence{q"'}n-~isconvergentin0(Cr)andthelimitislimm...Wqm((O~)1ErJ~
0 if and only if a~s are identical acro.cs j E I, and
2) tor each m fixPd, the implementation of C is a perfect equilibrium of the game
GI ('. y," ).
'I'he interpretation of ihe criterion is straiqhtforward. F'or each equilihrium tmderstanding
in (' to be simultaneously eligible, you must be able to find a neaz-by situation G(C,qm) in
which 1) Pyuilibrium misunderstandfnR in the form of heterogeneous identity configuration
(a~ )~Er such that a` ~ o' for some i, i' E I is almost probability zero and 2) it is rational for
Pvery pla,yPr i to implement a; if he believes the equilibrium o. Note that we do not require
:~ny ,pecilir form u( tuatrhiuK pruhabilít,v exr~~pt the ronditiou that. x th~~ory tuistako is very
rarc~. '1'he rfsJer may eaeily verify that the iuformal MBA matcttiug story given above for
the Rame uf Pigure 2 cau be formall,y stated as sa,ying that the set C- {o~t,os} is consistent
x~ t n ut - t-s.m i n tn ti s by takinR tóe wquence {q'"},,,-t as q"'(o ,a ,a )- z if o - o - o - o or o
and q'"(o~, o~t, o~tt )- fm otherwise where cm is a small positive number converging to zero.
"I'he "mistaken theoriesr refinement selects an equilibrium o if there exists a consisteat set
(' such tha,t n E C.
3. MAIN RESULTS
We now present our main results about what kind of refinement the consistency criterion
provides us. First note that, for any perfect equiGbrium o, the singleton set C-{o}
is automatirally consistent, since any probability q E Int~(Cr) is det;enerate to pick the
rPplica tree I(((r~ )~Er) with o~ - o(j E I) for sure. Sínce any finite extensive form gamewith perfect rerall has at least one perfect equilibrium, the following existence result ie
immcdiate.
Pro-position 1
I'Or a1lY finite extensive form game with perfect recall, there exists at least one con-
sistent .et of stratrgy profiles. Specifirally a singleton set of perfect equiGbrium is
consistrut.
Second. the consistency criterion allows any kinds ot behavior modes to be matched.
Once a player (i,o) sees a deviation from his equilibrium understanding o, the original
Pxpectation that they are playing o with almost probablity one is upset. In this occasion
there is no neeessit,v that he seeks the deviator's equilibrium understanding d from the
set of Nash PquiGbria of the original game. It migltt be possible that variety of behavior
modos beyond Nash eyuilibria support earh other in a player matching environment. The
following result, however, says that it is not possible. (See Appendix for the proof.)
Proposition 2
4~r any finite extensive form game G with perfect recall, if a nonempty finite set C of
behavior strategy profiles in C is consistent, then any strategy profile o E C is a Nash
equilibrium of the uriginal game C.
Wilh Prupusition I and Nroposition 'l together, the consistenry eriterion provides a
nonomptv mfinement between Nash equiGbrium and perfect equilibrium. The notion of
.eqnentiaJ equilibrimn altio prrnides a refinemont betwfrn Nash erluilibrinm and perfect
eqnilihrium. 'I'hon doe, Ihe cuusisteucy rriteriuu induce the eyuilibrium hypothesis o(
sequential oyuilibrium and justify the sequential rationality requirement? The answer is
atfirmative for the [ollowing class of games. ( See Appendix for the proof.)
Proposition 3
Fbr any generic perfect information game, which has a unique perfect equilibrium,
Ihcro oxitils a uniyue runsistent set of strateqy profihre. The set is a singleton set of
lhe per(ect equiGbrium.
`ow the requirement that a player expects att equifibrium play in the future at any informa-
tion set is not an exogeuously imposed hypo~hesis but au indogenously induced implication8
of thc "mistaken theorics" refinement for a generic perfect information game. For the game
ot Figure 1, for example, we can claim that the Nash equilibrium (A, L;d) is unreasonable,
without resortinq to the equilibrium hypothesis in the theory of sequential equiGhrium.
This result is in a sharp contrast with the result of Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine (1988),
which was detnonstrated in Section 1, and comes from the fact that we exclude payoff un-
certainty. Proposition 3, however, does not generalize beyond perfect infotmation games.
An immediatc counter example is the game of Figure 'l. As we showed, the Nash equiGb-
rium aH -( D; n, N';1) is supported by the "ruistakeu theories" refinement even though it
is not seyuential. The eyuilibrium hypothesis apparently collapses for an H-school player
11 after ~l in the MBA matching story since he does not expect the equilibrium action !
prescribed (or player III by oH but rather expects a lottery il t~r from player III.
Deyond perfect infortnation qames, although the exact form of the equilbrium hypoth-
c~~in in thr thc,ury of.~~yurnt.ial ~~quilibrium i, mit justified by thc~ ronsistonry crileriun, is it
still possible tu.jnstitg sume implieation of the liypothc~sis in the form o( backward induc-
tion'! 'I'hr puwrr r,f thc~ ~Ytuilibrium hypolhcsin ix that wo can solve a rational play backward
since a plaver chooses his optimal action at any iníotmation set by assuming that the rest
of the plac will follow thc~ palti~rn alrraJy calcnlated backward up to that information set.
Then, as Kohlberg and Mertens ( 19R6) argucd~ one might hope that, for an,y game G
aud any proper subgame g of C, if an equiGbrium o in G is selected by the consistency
criterion, then the restriction o~9 of the equilibrium to the subgame g is also selected as
an eyuilibrium for the qame g by the consistency criterion so that we can solve o~y first
and then solce n given the obtained o~y. By Proposition 3, of course, the hope is fulfilled
for a generic perfect information game. But, again, it does not generalize beyond perfect
information games. The game of Pigure 3 is a generic counter example. The strategy pro-
file (,1, w) is not a Nash equiGbrium of game g. By Yroposition 2, therefore, the profile is
never supported for the game g by the consistency criterion. For the backward induction
property to hold, the prescription ( A, w) should not be given for the proper subgame g by
any strategy profile a of the entim game of Figure 3 whirh is supported by the consistency
rriterion. l3ut a set of thrce strategy profiles o - ( A;I,w),a' - (S;r,w),o" - (W;r,s)
is ~nu.istent Irv t.akinx tho ,oyuenrr {q,"E~~„t :u: ?"`(ot on) - t-~'M if pl - ~tt - ~ ~e
'"1'bis prc~pertv is t.hr'ir properly ( Hl I).9
or o'c and qm(at,ott) - Em otherwise where Em is a small poeitive number converging to
zero.s Thus the conaistency criterion does not satisfy the backward induction property for
general games.
9. COIYCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has proposEd a`mistakeu theories" refinement, which models equilibrium mis-
understandings among rational players, and examined the extent that the eqnilibrium hy-
pothesis of sequential equilibrium is endogenously justified. We conclude this paper with
three remarks on the embedding approach adopted by thie paper to accomplish these taske.
First, one of the advantages of our approach is to avoid a counterfactual argument which
many refinements after Kreps and Wilson (1982), e.g. Cho and Kreps (1987), had to rely
on in invoking so called forward induction. Forward induction assumes that a deviation
from a presupposed eyuilibrium can convey information about the deviator's motivation of
his dcviation. But if the presupposed eqnilibrium is really presumed, there should not exist
any motivation to deviate. In our approach, a deviation can coavey information about
the deviator's behavior mode endogenously via a presumed matching model of àifferent
equilibrium understandings without invoking such a counterfsctual argument as forward
induction.
Second, in order to develop a satisfactory `mistaken theories" refinement, it is not
enou~h to allow a positive possihility t.hat. ,ome of your opponents has an equilibrium
understanding dilferent fmm your own. Some seminal works, e.g. Hinmore (198?) and
t;reps (1989), do examine such a possibilit,y. But what would happen to that opponent's
rationaGty if he also foresees the positive posaíbility that he must play with a player like
you who has an equilibrium understanding different from hie own? The argument proposed
without an explicit matching model can lead to an unsatisfactory conclusion. An example
is the Selten's (1975) horse qame of Figure 4. The Nash bat nonsequential equilibrinm
o-(D,a,R) can be supported by allowing a positive possibility that player I and III
"'1'he poim of the proof is that in game C(C, qm ) for each m fixed, as the trembling hand
perturbation goes to zem, player I of identity o seeing r attributes the deviation mostly
Pither to pla}.er !I of identity o' or to player II of identity o" with almost equal weights,
which inducPS player I's expectation close to 2w } ~s in subgame g.lo
~o~rialy 5ee a different way o' -(A,a,L) to play the game.9 If player [I who initially
bclieved o secs A from player I, 6e updates 6is guess about his opponents' equilibrium
understanding from v to a'. Civen the updated guese, player II's choice of a is rational.
But if wr allow a poaitive possibility that player III who believes o' play against player II
who believes n, it is natural to allow also a positive possibility that player III who believes
o' play against player I who believes o. Once we allow the latter possióiGty, it is not
rational Cor player III who believes o' to follow the prescription L. If playet III ie called
upon to move, he should conclude that he is not at node y but at node x since there is
no player's identity ronfiguration, ronsisting of o,a', which justifies A y d while o dces
presrribe 1) fur playor I. '1'Inls the nrt {a,a'} iti nol ronsistent.lo
1'hird, some may still hesitate to use an embedding technique of modeling possible
deviations for t.he reasou that the embedding twists the game in questiou from the original
game to the embedded onP. `tihirh is the true model that you want to analyse? For the kind
of embodding proposed by Fudenberg, h:reps and Levine (1988), we would conclude that
the answer is a matter of rPality or a matter of players' perceptions of reality.t) However,
it is possible to interpret our embedding not as twisting the nature of conflict described by
the original game but as a model of a way that people cope with that given contlict. Then
a set of strategy profiles being consistent carries the implication that there exists a way
to cope with the given conflict which admits all strategy profiles in the set. For example,
let ns interprct the game of Figure 3 as an augmented "battle of the sexes" game. In the
subgamo g, the players fare the "battle of the sexes" game extended by a safe option A
for player I. Ylayer II has the right to decide if they play the subgame g. One natural
way that pc~ople cope with the coordination problem like the "battle of the sexes" game is
to agree by preplay communication. Interestingly enough, we can interpret the matching
devire {q"`};;,--I given lo suppurt the set {o.a',n"} in Scction 3 a.e a modcl of pmplay
9 The argument llere is int.ended t.o be similar to the edurtive argumPnt whirh Binmore
(1987) proposed to defcnd o.
la Although the argument to justify o by o' is not satisfactory at all, the outcomc of a
Stlll fail bP ~ilpported FIV anOther rORFlStent APt Of fitrategy prOR1Cfi. COnFlder R" - ( D, 3 a f
~d, ll). 7'hP tiet {o',a"} ix fonsistent. by takiug the sequcnce {q'" },'-1 as qm(o',o',n'} -
q,i.(Rrr Rrr ~u) - y-12r„ q",(R~,on,o') - 15r" ,q.~(R' au,au) - 5t" , and q,"(RI Rlt Rltl}
-
rm otherwise wherc e"` is a small positive number converging to zero.
tt '1'he ronrlusion coincides with the ctaim of Rubinstein (1991).II
cum~uuni~atiou proros.. '1'hruuqh discrete tim~~ ni - I,'1,..., playcrs arc tryiuq tu rcach
a consensus about whirh equilibrium amonq o,o',d' should be playid. The conversation
at each mornent can stochastically chanqe each player's current understanding about how
to play but no player can see the inside of his opponents' minds for sure. If the stochastíc
nxture of the conversation is described by the above sequence {q'"}m-~, the players can
aqrec to qo for a play at any point of time by convincinq themselves that everybody is
satisfied with their own current understandinq and, as the players conduct the conversation
lonq enouqh to let m qo to infinity, the possibility of real consensus in the sense that all
the pla,yers do share the same understandinq goes to one. This is what we expect from
preplay cornrnunication as a method to solve a coordination problem. Furthermore the way
that this specific communication process solves the coordination problem is in agreement
wit.h our intuition. In this spc~cific model, for example, it is very possible that player II's
ruind sticks to o throughout the conversation until a play. Then player 11 shovld take the
quit option 1 since he expects that if he qces to the subqame g by r, player I of identity
o will be upset and take the safe option .1. And them does exist a qood reason on the
side of play~,r I tu tako thc~ safc option .t if 6e expcrted o before the play. '1'he player l's
understandinq in this case is that they failed to agree on either the coordination to (S, w) or
the coordination to (K',.g) throuqh thc conversation until the play. So, even if he is forced
to play the subqame g by player lI, he does not see any clear intention of player lI either to
play (.S, w) or to play ( W, s).12 Thus the prescription ( A, vr) [or g by o makes sense even
thouqh the backward induction property breaks down here. One would say that, for the
qamP of I'iqure 3, the embeddinq of the "mistaken theories" refinement is offering a model
of a way that people cope with the coordinatiou problem by failinq to satisfy the backward
iuduction property.
APPENDIX
Proof of Propoeitioa 2: Suppose that a finite set C of strateqy profiles in a finite
extensive form qame C with perfect recall is eonsistent. Let {qm}m-i be the sequence in
Int:,(('t) which support.s the consistency of C. Fix any m E N. Then the implementation
~~ 'I'his corresponds to thP arqument in footnote R.12
.v of C' is a perfect equilibrium of game C(C,qm). Therefore the implementation s of C is
a tiush oquilibrium of Rame G(C,qm). "Chis cneans that (or any i E I, an,y o E C and any
.y' „ E `~,, we have
t~~(C y~,(3i.o, a-(i,s i I~GÍC.VT 1 ,
.o )) - ~.o ( Ri,a,~-t,,o)) (1)
whem, for any .a' E~iEr~,EC Ei, the expression U;óc'yTi(s') denotes the expected utility
which player ( i,a) receivPS in iqarne C(C',q"`) when a play is conducted according to the
strateRy profilr .d, For any n' t- ~ Fr ~,'i, jet. I',(o') denote t.he expectrd ut.ilit.,y which pla,yer
i rereives iu the original qame C when a play is conducted according to the stratep,y pro(ile
a'. "i'hen, by ntilizinq the definition .qi,o, - o~ (j E I,ni E C) of the implementation s of
(', we can wrile
c((',yTt ~ ,~.a (a.o~9-li.ot)- ~ Qm(O.(~J)JiEi)f~i(gi~o,(~)J~i)'
(o' l, r, ECr~'
Hence, bv dividing both sidesof (1) by ~t~,i M E~It, qm(o,(ei)i~;) 10, we have
` `
( o' 1, t, EC'r`,
9m(Q,(aJ)J~i)
,n )Ui(~i,(~)iyti)
lo'I,s.ECrt' 9 íR.(aJ)i~ ) J
(2)
~ ~ ~ Qm(O,(OJ)iifi) ,
~ m )Ui(si.c,(~)i;fi)'
to'hs,EC,t, lo'),aEC`~~9 ( o,ÍQJ)i~i) J
'1'he inequality ( 2) must hold for any m E N. l.et m go to infinity. Since the consistency
requires that limm-„~ q'"(o,(oJ)i~;) 1 0 if and only if aJ - o for any j ~ i, we have
~ q~(a,(oJ)J~,) '`-( 1 if oi - a for any j~ i lim J t
' y~ ~(o~),N,ECn' 9m(o.1~J)i~ ) 0 otherwiae.
fherefnre the iuequality (Y) in the limit is
r~il~i,l~i)i~i)? f~i(xi.o~(~i)it~). (3)
Since the inequality (3) holds for any i E I and any s;,, E ~;, the strategy profile o is a
Nash eyuilibrium of the uriKinal qame C. ~~
Proofof Propoaition 3: Let C, be a perfect intormation game satisfying the following two
conditions. k'irst there exists a unique perfect eyuilibrium o' in pure stratep,ies. Second,13
at any decision node z, the action a'(x) prescribed by o' is a anique best action among
the set A(x) of available actions at node z for player i(z), who owns the node x, given the
successive play accordinq to a'. The second condition can be formally stated as followa.
Let 'l, be the set. of terminal nodes of C, and, for any node y, let 7,(y) be the subset of
terminal nodes which are reached via node y. For any i E I and any z E Z, the payoff
to player i at node z is denoted by u;(z). For any noninitial node y, let p(y) denote the
immediate predecessor oí node y and let o(y) denote the action which leads node p(y) to
node y. k'or any I E {0} U N, let p~(y) denote the óth predecessor of node y as long as such
a predecessor exists. For an,y~ node y and any terminal node a E Z(y), let l(y, z) denote the
nnmber satisfying y- ptf~~'t(z). Then Lhe second eondition13 is that




~ ~ ~ ~~fr~4~f,tt(rr(t''(-))) n;frt(-) for any a E A(r) ` a'(x). (4)
'E7.f~i-'lull ~-0
It is well known that a perfect ioformation game satisfying these two conditions is generic.
"fake such a pcrfect information game G fixed. We shall show that the uinique consistent
set of stratregy profiles in G is C-{o'}.
Suppose that a finitc set (' of strategy profiles in G is consistent. Let {qm}m-~
be the sequence in Ini:~l('r) which supports the consistency of C'. Fix any m E N.
Then the implementation s of C is a perfect equióbrium of game G(C,q"`). Therefore the
implementation .~ of C' is a sequential equilibrium strategy profile of game C(C,q"`). Let
p'" : y-~( ~) -. [0,1] be the Kreps and Wilson (1982) belief system of game G(C,qm)
ronstituting the sequential equilihrium (s,~im) where .~' is the set of dccisiou nodes of C.
('onsider any player (i,o) E I x C and any information set h of player (i,o) in G(C,qm).
For any node y E h, sinc~ C is a perfect information game, there exists a node x of G
snch that y(h) - r and tbero exisl.s an opponent's identity profile (o~ )~~; E('r~' suel~ that
y- 7-~lr)nT(o,(o~)~~;). "fherefore we can write N"`(y) - p"'(ry-'(x)nT(o,(o~);~;)).
~~ HPre we use a notational conveniion that if I(e-'(a'(x)),z) - 0, the expression
ry~~-'(n'fr)6.)-~ ~~-o a~fn„yat(a(P~lz))) reduces to ].14
"fhen the zequential rationality o(strateRy s;,, for player ( i,a) at information set h implies
~ ~~lm(7-f(r)nÏ~(O.(nJ)j;f~))








c ~7 , ~, ~
{ L 11 0~1~.~jsj~(a(P (z))) u;(z)}) for any a E A(z). (5)
-E"lln-~(a)) f-0
Given this fact, we proceed with the following induction. fior any nouterminal node
r E.~~ in the oriqinal game C, let L(x) be the hight of the subgame starting from node
r in (:, dPfined b' L r ~ } ( I- maX:EZ(r) I(7, z). Let .K he partitioned into X-~L-~ Yt.
by defining `r, -{r E -k~L(r) - L} and L - maxrE.r L(z). The induction will be with
respMt to L. ('onsider l. - I. 'I'ako any r E tl. Then, since node r is adjacent to terminal
nodes in Z(r), the inequality (-1) reduces to
u;(r)(a-f(a~(z))) ~ u,Irt(o-Ifa)) for any a E A(z) `a'(x). (6)
Consider any o E C and the corresponding player (i(x),o) in game C(C,qm). Then the
inPquality (5) for his sequential rationality also reduces to
~ [(Im(~-~(2)nl'(O.(~J)l~ilr))) ~ oi(x)(a~)ui(r)(a-t(a~))]
(a' Irf,~.~Ef~~`.~, i a.EA(r)
1 ~ [pm(7-1(r)nT(o,(~')j~i(r))) ui(rl(o-r(a)),.
1"' hr,i..Et~i~~„ ~
which furtlter simplifies to
( t` ~f,,.17-f(r)nT(o.(~J)j~~lr))))l ~ o~lr)(a~)u~lr)(á-f(á))]
l10' 1, s.vL~E('i~.c. ~ a' EA(r)
? ~ ~ pm(ry-~(z)nT(o,(~')J~ur)))~ uf(r)(o-1(a))
(o' ).r.i. iEC't~.,. ~
and, since~~,) ~~ Er.,~,rr~ pm(7-'(z)nT(o.(oj);~;tr)))) - 1, further to
~ o~tr)(a~) v~(r)(o-~la~)) ? uf(r)(o-1(a)) for any a E A(x).
~'EAlrl
(7)is
)3y tóe inequality ( 6), tho inequality (7) implies that ni(,)(a'(x)) -. I, that is, o is identical
with o' uver the set A(x). Since this holds !or any x E Y~ and any o E C, we know that
any o E (' is ideutical with o' over the set UrEt, A(x).
Now consider L- 2. Take any x E Xz. Then for any z E Z(x), the namber !(x,z)
is either L or l. Since we have proved that any o E C is identical with o' over the
~.~
Fiet UiEt,A(2), this implies that the expresaion o~~,t,~~~~(a(p)(z))) in both sides of the
ineyuality (S) can be replaced by the expression oi~P,~,(Z))(a(pt(z))). Then for any o E
C and any corresponding player ( i(x),a) in game G(C,qm), the ineqnality (5) for his





n; n o,-(y~„(~))(a(P(z))) ni(r)(-'))~ ~ ( ~)( ~ ~ '
a'E.4(r) xET.(rt-~(a')) (-0







~ oi(a'll ~ ~ ~;(P~.~(.)J(R(p)(z))) ni(~1(z))




~ o;(~~~(~p(Q(P!(z))) ni(r)(2) for any a E A(z).
1-0
(8)
Hy the inequalit,ti~ (a), thc inequality (8) implies that o;(r)(a'(z)) - 1, that is, o is identical
with o' over the set ,I(z). Thus wc know that any o E C, is identical with e' over the set
Uj,-~ UrEtc :1(x ). The prcxedure for L - 2 can be repeated to L- L and we conclude that
any o E C' is ideutical with o' over the set Uy-i UrEtc A(z) - UyEXA(s). This means
tha( auy o E(' ís aetu:dly a' itsel(. ~~16
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